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Preface 
Hundreds or even thousands of international legal instruments on "the environment" 
are in existence. What happens to international environmental agreements once they are 
signed, and how does the process of implementing such agreements influence their 
effectiveness? These are the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation 
and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC)". Research teams 
are examining these questions from many angles and with different methods. 
One of the areas of the IEC project where other scholars have devoted much 
attention is the question: "Why do nations and people comply with international law?" 
The question which is at the nexus of international law and political science, is one of the 
few areas where scholars from both disciplines have made substantial contributions to a 
common question. 
In this paper, Alexei Roginko surveys the literature on compliance. The paper 
offers a very helpful starting point for scholars wanting to conduct further research in the 
field. Notably, the paper illustrates how the "compliance" question is one that requires 
insights from the literature on domestic and international politics. The link between 
domestic and international is a topic that is now receiving much attention by political 
scientists who are attempting to merge models of poltical behavior at the national level 
(where national "interests" are formed and interational policies are implemented) with 
behavior at the international level (where international policies, such as treaties and 
standards, are negotiated and codified). 
The IEC project is now conducting several studies on the implementation of 
international politics at the domestic level. The issues raised and literature reviewed in 
this paper are a starting point for that research. 
The context of this paper in the IEC project 
This paper is one of several IEC working papers that survey the existing literature, 
place the project in a framework of prior research, and identify the major questions that 
deserve further study. At the outset, members of the project decided to prepare these 
papers to ensure that we were adequately aware of other research in the field and, 
especially, to ensure that we would be studying the most important questions in the 
proper context. The papers that play these roles are listed below, divided into each of the 
three areas of IEC's research program. Fuller descriptions of different parts of IEC's 
research program are available in the IEC project description (copies available from IEC) 
and in the prefaces and working papers listed below. 
1. Historical case-study and comparative research 
Most of IEC's research is directed at studying how international environmental 
agreements have been implemented historically through examination of case- 
studies and focussed comparisons among selected cases. Teams are studying 
domestic implementation as well as international and transnational processes. 
Eight papers review the relevant literature and establish the context and 
research questions: 
Research on implementation at the domestic level in Western Europe and 
in the Eastern economies undergoing transformation: 
o Steinar Andresen, Jon Birger Skjaerseth, and Jmgen Wettestad, 
1994, "Regime, the State and Society--Analysing the 
Implementation of International Environmental Commitments". 
o Vladimir Kotov, 1994, "Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes During the Process of 
Economic Transformation in Russia". 
o Elena Nikitina, 1994, "Domestic Implementation of International 
Environmental Commitments: a Review of Soviet Literature". 
o Alexei Roginko, 1994, "Domestic Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements: a Review of Current Literature". 
Research on international and transnational processes of implementation: 
o David G. Victor with Owen J. Greene, John Lanchbery, Juan 
Carlos di Primio and Anna Korula, 1994, "Roles of Review 
Mechanisms in the Effective Implementation of International 
Environmental Agreements". 
o David G. Victor, John Lanchbery and Owen Greene, 1994, "An 
Empirical Study of Review Mechanisms: Report on Work in 
Progress". 
o David G. Victor with Anna Korula, 1994, "What Is an 
International Environmental Agreement?" 
o Owen J. Greene, 1994, "On Verifiability, and How It Could 
Matter for International Environmental Agreements". 
2. Development of a database 
IEC is developing a database that will consist of key variables related to the 
development and effective implementation of international agreements. It will 
allow systematic use of historical evidence from a large number of cases. The 
goal is to make possible the testing of hypotheses and the drawing of general 
conclusions about which variables are causally linked to "effectiveness". One 
paper reviews the major hypotheses related to the formation and effectiveness 
of international regimes: 
o Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Ziirn, 1994, "The 
Study of International Regimes". 
3. Other research and policy activities 
IEC researchers are applying their research findings to current and future 
policy issues as opportunities arise. The project is also sponsoring a major 
simulation-gaming exercise to explore issues of institutional design, 
implementation and compliance in international environmental agreements. 
Simulations can help promote creative thinking about political options for 
international management of climate change, identify potential pitfalls, 
integrate policy-relevant knowledge from a variety of domains, and identify 
important policy-relevant knowledge needs. One paper surveys the benefits of 
using simulation-gaming as a policy and research tool: 
o Edward A. Parson, 1995, "Why Study Hard Policy Problems With 
Simulation-Gaming?" 
The above list includes only the papers that the project has used in establishing the 
framework for its research activities. A complete list of publications and copies of papers 
are available from the IEC ofices at ILASA. 
Alexei Roginko 
This essay is an attempt to review the main determinants of compliance with inter- 
national environmental commitments at the domestic level, with special attention to: 1) the 
mechanisms by which states determine whether or not to comply, and the roles actors, other 
than governments, play in these issues, and 2) regime rules and factors exogenous to the 
regime that affect variation in compliance, with implications for mechanisms by which 
compliance can be improved. 
Definitions 
Several writers who have written extensively on the subject provide quite similar 
definitions of compliance. Fisher (1981:20) defines compliance as conduct that conforms 
with a rule of international law. Young (1979: 104) defines it as "actual behavior of a given 
subject [that] conforms to prescribed behavior". Wasserman (1992:23), writing about 
domestic environmental enforcement, describes compliance as "essentially a state of being, 
when a regulated source is achieving required environmental standards, regulations, or permit 
conditions by meeting expected behaviors in processes and practices". Mitchell (1992:26) 
uses compliance to refer to an actor's behavior that conforms to a treaty explicit rules. As 
a subset of compliance, he distinguishes treaty-induced compliance as behavior that conforms 
to such rules because of the treaty compliance system.' While not always distinct in 
practice, we can conceptually distinguish between violation and non-compliance, using the 
former term to refer to an actor's behavior that intentionally fails to conform to such rules 
and the latter term to refer to such behavior when non-conformance is due to inadvertence 
or an incapacity to comply. 
Compliance alone does not mean the same as achieving treaty goals. First, com- 
pliance with a given treaty rule is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve treaty aims. It 
is not necessary because low compliance with a stringent rule may nonetheless accomplish 
treaty purposes. Compliance alone is not sufficient, because even perfect compliance with 
the "wrong" rule leaves treaty aims unaccomplished or even undermined (Young, 1991). 
Second, by defining compliance as actions conforming with explicit rules, behavior that 
facilitates treaty aims constitutes compliance only if those aims find expression in a treaty 
' Mitchell (1992:28) defines a "compliance system" as the complex of rules and procedures that determine 
the degree of compliance actually elicited with a given rule, subdividing it further into three components: (1) 
the primary rule system regulating the basic activity which is the target of regulation, (2) the compliance 
information system intended to collect, analyze, and disseminate information regarding the instances of, and 
parties responsible for, violations and compliance, and (3) the noncompliance response system governing the 
formal and informal responses, positive inducements or negative sanctions, undertaken to induce the non- 
compliant actors to comply. 
rule. For example, enacting treaty regulations into domestic law represents compliance only 
if the treaty explicitly requires such action (Mitchell, 1992).2 
I. MECHANLSMS BY WHICH STATES DETERMINE WHElBER TO COMPLY 
1. Domestic compliance and non-state actors 
Compliance with environmental treaties often involves a two-level enforcement game 
that mirrors the two-level negotiation game initially developed by Putnam (1988) and recently 
elaborated in Evans et al. (1993) with multiple case studies. The vast array of research on 
environmental politics at all levels demonstrates that the behavior that causes the 
environmental harm may be only partially susceptible to government control. Governments 
themselves may be reluctant to enforce the rules established in the treaty. Treaties 
addressing arms control or international trade predominantly target government action for 
regulation. In contrast, the primary, if often indirect targets of much environmental 
regulation are individual and corporate actions not directly under governmental control. In 
environmental treaties, especially, non-governmental entities play formal and informal roles 
within the compliance information and non-compliance response system. ' Especially in 
environmental affairs, we need to look inside the "black box" of the state to identify the true 
sources of compliance (Mitchell, 1992). 
Non-state actors often play an important role in providing effective responses to 
international environmental problems. For example, environmental NGOs clearly interact 
with international environmental regimes and institutions in complex ways. NGOs are often 
the sources of policy innovations at the international level, the instruments of diffusion of 
international norms and practices, and sources of national-level information at the 
international level. NGOs are often exercising greater influence than students of international 
politics have come to expect from actors who are weaker, according to conventional criteria, 
than their corporate and state adversaries (Haas et al., 1993). 
Business firms also interact with international environmental organizations and help 
to shape international rules. Corporations are especially significant in determining the range 
of technological solutions to environmental problems, hence in affecting the regime 
effectiveness. As a general rule, businesses that are directly affected by environmental 
regulation tend to resist the national and international policies they believe would impose 
significant new costs on them or otherwise reduce their expected profits. However, when 
businesses face stronger domestic regulations on an activity with global environmental 
dimension, they are likely to support international action to impose similar standards on 
competitors abroad, and may prefer an international agreement's standards to domestic ones, 
We should bear in mind that compliance is an "artifact of the standards" (Ausubel and Victor, 1992:22) 
or a "function of the rule" (Fisher, 1981), and that the primary interest of the current project lies, not just in 
determining whether a part to a treaty complies with its rules, but rather in tracing and uncovering complex 
relationships between rules and actors' behavioral changes. Nonetheless, partial, full, or over-compliance could 
be a useful measure (proxy) of the effectiveness of treaty rules and standards, provided that the central role of 
rule- and standard-making is not overlooked. Insofar as this is true, the study of compliance is relevant to a 
research program on the implementation and effectiveness of international environmental agreements. 
See Chayes and Chayes 199 1b: 3 18. 
because the former are less stringent (Porter and Brown, 1991). 
To elicit behavioral change effectively requires environmentally concerned states 
either to find mechanisms for directly influencing the behavior of private, sub-national actors 
who are nationals of other countries, or to find means to induce reluctant governments to 
influence that behavior themselves. Environmental treaties are prone to these problems, not 
evident in most other issue areas (Mitchell, 1992). 
Ultimately, it is national decisions that affect environmental quality, even though 
international measures may have been necessary to overcome national reluctance to act and 
to reach harmonized national measures (Haas et al., 1993). 
2. Types of national policy efforts: leaders and laggards 
Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993) identify four types of national policy efforts: 
1 . Some countries simply avoid international obligations by failing to sign treaty 
commitments. 
2. Others accept commitments but fail to live up to them. 
3. A third group accepts commitments and achieves ~ompliance.~ 
4. A fourth group goes significantly further than explicit obligations require. 
Countries that fall into first two categories are frequently called "laggards". Typically 
they enact much weaker environmental measures than others. The economic costs of 
increasing these measures may be high, and non-compliant laggards may have agreed to 
regulation only reluctantly. Many laggard countries have also supported collective policies, 
knowing that they would not have the scientific, technical or administrative capacity to 
implement the rules, but hoping that "joining the club" would entitle them to assistance ("free 
riders"). Rich laggards (such as Britain with respect to acid rain) may also respond to 
political embarrassment or pressure from their own scientists or the public. Poor ones may 
be responsive to pressure, but require financial aid. In fact, in some areas such as the Baltic 
Sea, international regulations have been the means for setting priorities for investment that 
required funding, either from public authorities in the wealthier countries of the region, or 
by private investors. 
"Leaders", on the other hand, willingly sign and comply with treaty commitments, 
and often go further than these commitments require. Leaders commonly possess a more 
advanced domestic environmental policy apparatus, and are often subjected to more intensive 
domestic pressure than other countries. Leaders are often motivated by being the first to 
suffer environmental damage; being first often means being most severely affected as well 
(Haas et al., 1993). States may also be tempted to lead because of potential economic 
benefits along at least two lines: first, leaders are setting technological standards and thus 
shape industrial policies. Once established, standards are self-enforcing, but the details of 
established standards have large consequences for the stakeholders, and the standard-setting 
process is sensitive to leadership, both because leaders can set the path and because leaders 
' Certainly, there are variations within this group as to the degree of compliance. Total compliance is 
seldom achieved, but outright noncompliance with any treaty rules also does not occur frequently. 
who are ineffective face enormous losses if their standards are not adopted. Second, there 
may be simpler economic benefits from leadership, such as those derived from introducing 
'environment-friendly' replacement products which are more profitable than the old ones. 
One example might be the phaseout of old-generation CFCs, which are less profitable than 
the replacements, with the stakeholders organized to support the phaseout, and the suppliers 
and consumers losing, because they were not organized well enough (see Maxwell and 
Weiner, 1993). 
Thus, domestic pressure, advanced policies, disproportionate damage and economic 
benefits, all give leaders higher levels of concern and capacity than others, which prompts 
them to promote institutional solutions to environmental problems. 
3. Causes of voluntary compliance 
What factors would lead a government or a subnational actor to comply with treaty 
rules even in the absence of a system for identifying and responding to non-compliance? 
Many authors argue that a significant degree of compliance can be expected from an actor 
even if any efforts by other parties to encourage compliance of treaty rules or discourage 
their violation are absent5 (see also para 4.1). As the following discussion suggests, in these 
cases compliance is not caused by a treaty but merely coincides with it. 
3.1 Rules require no change 
An actor may comply with primary treaty rules because they do not require any 
change in behavior. Through successful negotiation a country may place the entire burden 
for behavioral change on other states. To the extent that agreements reflect the lowest 
common denominator policies, "leader" states and their industries may find themselves in 
compliance without even changing their behavior (Mitchell 1992). 
3.2 Rules are ambiguous 
States may comply by negotiating vague and ambiguous primary treaty rules - either 
because of sincere differences about their contents, or in an effort to garner environmental 
praise by agreeing to terms that seemingly require behavioral change, but that, on closer 
examination, prove sufficiently vague to continue business as usual. In either case, since 
"they will naturally interpret and apply the provisions of international law in the light of their 
particular and divergent conceptions of the national interest" (Morgenthau, 1978), states will 
behave as their interests dictate and claim that their behavior is in compliance (Mitchell, 
1992). 
3.3 Rules codzjj preexisting interests 
H.Morgenthau makes the observation that "the great majority of the rules of international law are generally 
observed by all nations without actual compulsion" (Morgenthau, 1978). 0. Young similarly .claims that "states 
generally comply with the rights and rules of international institutions" (Young, 1989). 
This behavior is facilitated by virtual nonexistence of authoritative dispute settlement mechanisms at the 
international level. 
The most basic principle of international law is that "each nation is bound only by 
those rules of international law to which it has consented". Thus, most treaty rules will 
include only those prescriptions or proscriptions in which states have independent interest in 
taking or refraining from (Morgenthau, 1978). In fact, states seldom have to choose between 
pursuing self-interest and non-complying. Most agreements elicit high compliance precisely 
because they merely codify the preexisting self-interests of the parties (Gilpin, 1981). In 
some cases, the agreement itself may facilitate actions a government seeks to adopt by 
providing international legitimacy, which increases domestic political support for a policy the 
government hoped to implement in any event (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Mitchell, 1992). 
At the same time, since almost any treaty is necessarily a compromise, the outcome 
of the negotiating process may fall short of the ideal from the point of view of the particular 
interests of any state. However, if the agreement is well designed, compliance problems and 
enforcement issues are likely to be manageable. If issues of non-compliance and enforcement 
are endemic, the real problem is likely to be that the original bargain did not adequately 
reflect the interests of those who would be living under it, rather than mere disobedience 
(Chayes and Chayes, 1993). 
3.4 Rules codiJjl existing behavior 
A variation of the above is that states may negotiate agreements that proscribe 
undesirable actions during a period when none has incentives to undertake them, hoping to 
prevent future economic, political or technological changes producing pressure for such 
actions. Thus these agreements merely "codify existing behavior" (Keohane, 1984) (e.g . , 
Antarctic Treaty's constraints on mining). 
3.5 Sense of obligation 
Treaties are acknowledged to be legally binding on the states that ratify them. In 
common experience, whether as a result of socialization or otherwise, people accept that they 
are obligated to obey the law. So it is with states. It is often said that the fundamental norm 
of international law is pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be obeyed). In many countries of 
the world, they became a part of the law of the land. Thus, a provision contained in an 
agreement to which a state has formally assented entails a legal obligation to obey and is 
presumptively a guide to action (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). 
According to Oran Young, "'obligation' encompasses incentives to comply with 
behavioral prescriptions which stem from a general sense of duty which do not rest on 
explicit calculations of costs and benefits.. . Feelings of obligation often play a significant role 
in compliance choices" (Young, 1979:23). 
The strongest circumstantial evidence for the sense of an obligation to comply with 
treaties is the care that some states take in negotiating and entering into them. No doubt, it 
reflects the desire to limit the states's own commitments as much as to make the evasion by 
others more difficult. In either case, the enterprise makes sense only on the assumption that, 
as a general rule, states acknowledge an obligation to comply with agreements they have 
signed (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). 
3.6 Compliance is habitual (eflcient) 
Several factors may lead states to avoid continuously recalculating whether compliance 
proves to be in their interest. Especially if the costs of compliance are low and if compliance 
has been initiated, the exigencies of bounded rationality and bureaucratic procedures may 
make compliance habitual. Governments create standard operating procedures to reduce the 
frequency with which they must make decisions of any sort (Allison, 1971). Considerable 
policy continuity is dictated by efficiency considerations. In areas of activity covered by 
treaty obligations, the alternative to the recalculation of interests is to follow the established 
rule. From the point of view of organization theory, the adoption of a treaty, like the 
enactment of any other law, establishes an authoritative rule system. "Rules constitute an 
essential feature of bureaucracies and ... routinized compliance with rules is a deeply 
ingrained norm among bureaucrats". Compliance is the normal organizational presumption 
(Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Young, 1979). 
The fact that the law is observed by obligation and habit means that many obligations 
will be honored even when they are ill-conceived. By some measures, badly designed 
agreements are inefective because they do not reflect underlying interests. But from an 
environmental perspective, and the perspective implied in this project, they may be highly 
effective. Some agreements may push obligations into the future or to less powerful groups, 
making the cost of obligations less transparent. The Montreal Protocol may be one such 
agreement. Typically, agreements on complex and uncertain issues are marked by an 
inability to forecast the magnitude and distribution of costs of action, thus making it possible 
that real costs will be unacceptable. Despite costs and inconvenience that might not be 
acceptable if transparent at the outset, habit and obligation may induce compliance. It is 
crucial to examine these and other 'hard cases' to demonstrate the role of rules and standards 
in shaping behavior (see e.g. Young, 1992). 
3.7 Linkages to other issues 
Because of the growing interdependence of states and a sense of "community" among 
a relatively stable set of actors, there are strong incentives to comply with international 
agreements - even where it may not be in a state's immediate interest to do so - because the 
negative consequences of non-compliance may be felt in other issues (Keohane and Nye, 
197711989). Because issues are interlinked, states have a variety of mechanisms outside the 
environmental treaty framework to ensure compliance; formal enforcement may not be 
needed where economic and political interdependencies can be used to ensure compliance 
through "diffuse reciprocity" extending over time and across other issues (Keohane, 1986). 
Cases of "high" politics such as nuclear arms control, where national security is the issue, 
may be characterized by lower interdependence and thus a lower assurance of compliance 
(Ausubel and Victor, 1992). 
4. Causes of non-compliance 
Despite the many incentives for voluntary compliance outlined above, treaty signatures 
are not always followed by compliance with treaty rules.7 Nations frequently violate even 
' As is noted by Keohane (1984), "The extent of international compliance should not be overstated". 
6 
relatively low-cost reporting requirements, and quite often ignore more substantive provisions 
(see, e.g., GAO, 1992). What factors seem to determine the states' preference for non- 
compliance? 
4.1 Deliberate violations 
A state may deliberately prefer non-compliance because the benefits of compliance 
simply do not outweigh its costs (provided that coercive efforts are absent).' There may be 
several reasons for this. First, some actors, being classical free-riders, may consciously sign 
treaties to garner the political benefits of membership without any sincere intention to comply 
as well as seeking to avoid the direct costs of compliance. Other states may feel strong 
domestic and international pressures to sign an agreement independent of its compliance 
costs. States may also view most, but not all, rules in a treaty as in their interests, leading 
them to sign, with the intention of complying with most but not all rules. Further, the state 
may value compliance by itself and by others and even deem that the benefits of compliance 
outweigh its costs, but may nonetheless prefer non-compliance because of the domestic list 
of priorities. Other problems may simply prove more pressing. Finally, certain states may 
simply not view compliance with treaty rules as having benefits. A state may acknowledge 
that certain actions would improve the environment without placing any value on that 
improvement. A consensus of values need not exist (Mitchell, 1992). 
Whether deliberate non-compliance is common or "exceptional" behavior remains an 
empirical question . However, as Professor Louis Henkin tells us in How Nations Behave, 
despite some conspicuous departures, "almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time" (Henkin, 1979). 
Echoing him, Chayes and Chayes (1993: 188) argue that "only infrequently does a treaty 
violation fall into the category of a wilful flouting of legal obligation". 
4.2 Lack of domestic concern 
Governmental concern should be sufficiently high to prompt states to devote resources 
to solving the problem, even if they are scarce. Since, typically, concern is generated by 
political action within societies, it is most likely to be insufficient without active networks 
of individuals and groups who are linked to the political system, point out environmental 
hazards and demand action on them (Haas et al., 1993). The key condition for this 
mechanism is the adequate transparency of government policy and behavior. 
4.3 National incapacity 
4.3.1 Financial (material) incapacity 
Even actors who perceive compliance as beneficial may fail to comply because the 
The cost-benefit approach to decision-making on whether to violate the rules is the core of the economic 
analysis of compliance applied primarily at domestic level. Much of this can be traced to the works of Becker 
(1968) and Stigler (1970) on optimum enforcement of laws and the deterrent value of various sanctions such 
as fines and imprisonment. These have been extended to the case of environmental pollution by Downing & 
Watson (1974) and Storey and McCabe (1980), and synthesized by Russell et al.(1986, 1990). 
necessary resources are lacking. The fact that compliance benefits are perceived as ex- 
ceeding its costs does not necessarily mean that those costs can be absorbed. In economic 
terms, willingness to pay cannot equate with ability to pay. Non-compliance can be due to 
an inability, rather than an unwillingness, to comply (Young, 1992). This source of non- 
compliance is highlighted in the mechanisms established in several recent environmental 
accords on the financing of compliance (see Section II, para 1.3.1 below). 
4.3.2 Administrative (regulatory) incapacity 
To make the domestic adjustments necessary for compliance with international norms 
and rules, states must also possess the political and administrative capacity. Leaders of 
weakly institutionalized states may genuinely want to conform to international norms and 
principles, but may lack the political legitimacy, or the loyalty of competent and honest 
bureaucracies necessary to develop and implement domestic initiatives. An international 
regime creates an external demand for effective domestic action, and international coalitions, 
including NGOs, may prompt increasing internal demand; but severe constraints may exist 
on the ability of the state to supply effective policy (Haas et al., 1993). 
By political capacity, Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993) refer not only to the ability of 
governments to make and enforce laws and regulations, but also to the broader ability of 
actors in civil society to play an effective role in policy-making and implementation. Civil 
society must be capable of generating discussion and criticism of governmental action and 
inaction, and of participating and in carrying out policies that respond to environmental 
problems. Typically, developing countries and the governments of Eastern Europe have 
lacked adequate capacity on both the governmental and societal dimensions - governments 
have often been unable either to understand or to regulate the impact of their citizens and 
industrial enterprises on the environment; and groups within civil society that could have 
been the source of information and criticism either did not exist or have been repressed. 
The lack of administrative capacity is particularly acute with regard to environmental 
treaty compliance, since it requires that a government successfully alters the actions of 
myriad sub-national actors. A government may lack either the informational or regulatory 
infrastructure necessary to successfully elicit compliance? Even developed Western states 
have not been able to construct such systems with the confidence that they will achieve the 
desired objectives. Excessive task duplication, unclear sharing of responsibilities, as well 
as inter-agency rivalry and lack of exchange of information are common impediments to 
giving full effect to the rules of an international regime (Hildebrand, 1992).1° While these 
Inefficiency of domestic administrative structures is particularly pronounced if the international regime is 
not supported by an enforcement agency that has the power and the means to interfere directly in the member 
states* internal implementation process (Hildebrand, 1992). 
'O As discussed in detail by Weale, constitutional and administrative limitations in governmental structures 
result in the design of administrative institutions that do not match the holistic nature of environmental problems. 
The problems of interdepartmental coordination and inter-sectoral collaboration increase as environmental 
policy moves from mitigating the effects of pollution to controlling its sources. Since the causes of pollution 
are found typically in production and consumption patterns, which fall under the responsibility of non- 
environmental departments, environment ministries can initiate action, but they typically have to collaborate 
extensively if they are to get beyond the stage of exhortation (Weale 199252-53). 
problems may be reduced to being simply variants of financial incapacity problems, cultural 
and social contexts may also make compliance significantly more difficult to elicit from the 
citizenry of one country than another (Mitchell, 1992; Chayes and Chayes, 1993). 
The general characteristics of a state's administrative structure and authority held by 
the government also may affect a state's capacity to comply with the rules of an international 
environmental regime. In broad measure, a strong state ability to implement agreements will 
be greater than that of a weak one (Krasner, 1978). Arguably, an indicator of the strong vs. 
weak state may be the degree of centralization. However, a highly centralized state model 
has its own shortcomings from the standpoint of compliance. One of them is a limited ability 
to track down the performance of small private actors scattered throughout the country. In 
addition, under this model, it is difficult for local concerns to be put on the agenda of the 
central government and to be accounted for during the regime preparation phase. 
Unsatisfactory local compliance can, therefore, reflect the fact that regime's rules are not 
always relevant to a given local or regional situation (Hildebrand, 1992). In addition, 
centralized states are ineffective if the central bureaucracy is ineffective - decentralized 
systems are bound to be more variable, but on balance, the opportunities for experimentation 
and learning in diverse settings may promote overall effectiveness, even though some locali- 
ties could still exhibit poor compliance. 
Even in highly decentralized systems, implementation and enforcement can be made 
effective if those systems are tuned to the decentralized nature of the state. For example, 
compliance may be enhanced where incentives exist for individuals and groups concerned to 
enforce actions through the courts. As is shown by Naysnerski and Tietenberg (1992), 
private enforcement offers a number of advantages over a public one, particularly when 
public enforcement agencies seem reluctant to to enforce pollution violations committed by 
public facilities. Private enforcers can complement public enforcers, producing greater com- 
pliance and, quite possibly, a more responsible public sector. In addition, courts can be an 
important mechanism for integrating locally different laws and other additional venues for 
activists to press their cases (see Burley and Walter, 1993).11 
As the above discussion suggests, it is not obvious which structure of government is 
more effective from the standpoint of compliance. The key issue here is probably not the 
administrative structure of a state, but rather the extent to which authority and information 
are exchanged between the local and the international levels. Where connections are tight, 
multiple levels of governance can be highly effective; where connections are loose, the 
effectiveness can be close to nil. This suggests that we look more closely at the types of 
connections, which may take form of bureaucratic rules, procedures for audits and 
oversights, incentives to private actors, etc., rather than just the state structure as an 
independent variable affecting compliance levels. 
4.4 Inadvertence 
This can both increase and decrease compliance, depending on the court, although multiple points of 
access to justice may on balance favor those who seek to ban or to limit the polluting activities, because risk 
averse firms will have more risks of legal entanglement to fear. 
States may take actions sincerely intended and expected to achieve compliance but 
nonetheless failing to meet standards established in an agreement. Environmental rules 
establishing aggregate national targets for pollution reduction may pose particular problems 
in this regard. Even developed states may implement domestic policies in order to alter the 
behavior of sub-national actors, but fail to achieve their intended results. Moreover, 
programs that succeed in bringing one country into compliance may fail in another. Whether 
due to misguided policy or to the inherent uncertainties in outcomes of certain policies, the 
multi-level nature of environmental compliance may make compliance due to inadvertence 
especially common (see Mitchell, 1992). 
Where systems are relatively simple and predictable, inadvertence may be rare. 
However, in large complex systems, like the one which is dealt with in this project, the 
opportunities of (sometimes catastrophic) unintentional consequences increase significantly 
(see Perrow, 1984). 
4.5 Ambiguity of treaty language 
For various reasons, international negotiations quite frequently produce a zone of 
ambiguity in a treaty, within which it is difficult to say, with precision, what is permitted and 
what is forbidden. This may happen, either because treaty drafters do not foresee many of 
the potential applications, or because the political consensus does not support more precise 
formulations of obligations at this moment. In either case, there is often a considerable range 
within which parties may adopt differing positions as to the meaning of the obligation, thus 
raising the issue of compliance, with one party charging another with violation. 
However, compulsory means of authoritative dispute resolution - by adjudication or 
otherwise - are not generally available at the international level.12 In this case (and even 
sometimes when there is an authoritative arbiter), discourse among the parties, often within 
hearing of a wider public audience, is an important way to clarify the meaning of the rules 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993). l3 
4.6 Impact of the nature of the problemlindustry on compliance 
The nature of regulated industry and the environmental problem impose constraints 
on the types of monitoring and enforcement processes available. In many problems, such 
as the preservation of wetlands or world heritage sites, and in long-range transboundary air 
pollution, strategies to improve compliance must work through a two-level enforcement 
process, wherein concerned states sanction reluctant ones to induce them to enforce treaty 
commitments against their own nationals. As is demonstrated by Mitchell (1992), more 
significant obstacles to effective enforcement arise in such cases, as compared to more 
concentrated and internationalized industries, such as world tanker operation and construc- 
In fact, governments have been extremely reluctant to accept compulsory third-party adjudication: in the 
majority of global agreements concluded since the 1970s. each party can prevent a case from being taken to 
arbitration or to the International Court of Justice, since submission of disputes to third-party adjudication 
usually requires "common agreement' (Sand, 1990). 
" Perhaps a more usual way of operating in a zone of ambiguity is to design the activity to comply with 
the letter of the obligation, leaving others to argue about the spirit (Chayes and Chayes 1993). 
tion. The nature of the latter industries, while making organized opposition to the regulation 
of oil pollution from vessels more likely, facilitates, nevertheless, effective exercise of 
practical and legal jurisdiction by leading states over industrial actors, even those nominally 
based in other states. Several other environmental problems exhibit similar features of 
concentration or internationalization: e.g., the Montreal Protocol, CITES, and the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement all regulate activities that provide opportunities for 
directly sanctioning the actors responsible. 
11 FACTORS AFFECIlNG VARIATION IN COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLICATIONS ON HOW 
TO IMPROVE IT 
1 Factors endogenous to the regime 
1.1 Primary rules 
Primary treaty rules vary in clarity and specificity. Increasing specificity increases 
compliance in at least two ways. First, for actors predisposed to comply, specific rules make 
compliance easier by reducing the difficulty of deciding how to comply and the uncertainty 
about the consequences of such action. Less ambiguous treaty rules (see para 4.5 above) 
help actors who want to comply by clarifying what they need to do. Second, for actors 
predisposed to non-compliance, precise treaty language removes the excuse of inadvertence 
and misinterpretation from actors when they must account for non-compliance (Fisher, 1981; 
Mitchell, 1992). 
In addition, while transparency's main contribution to compliance is through im- 
proving compliance information and non-compliance response systems, it also can facilitate 
compliance by remedying non-compliance that arises due to uncertainty regarding the actions 
of others. By regulating more transparent actions, treaties increase compliance by assuring 
the actors predisposed to comply that others' non-compliance will be immediately visible and 
thus permit them to protect their interests by their own withdrawal (Mitchell, 1992).14 
Several other primary rule features, like the form and nature of regulations, may also 
be potentially significant with respect to enhancing compliance. For example, in designing 
environmental regulations, a tradeoff is often made between the stringency of a requirement 
and the long-term reliability of the control approaches upon which the requirement is based. 
Given the reluctance of regulated actors to invest in new and unproven technology, it makes 
sense, from an enforcement and compliance point of view, to favor the more reliable option 
and to rely upon accepted industry practice (Wasserman, 1992). 
The resulting compliance levels can also vary depending on the types of standards 
used in a treaty (technology or performance standards). Technology requirements are 
simpler to enforce and understand from a compliance standpoint: however, they are eco- 
l4 However, there exist cases when transparency is not beneficial to overall environmental effectiveness. 
For example, selective enforcement must not be transparent, at least not prior to the enforcement action. If the 
enforcement process is not transparent, all parties will be expecting to be caught violating the rules of the 
regime; otherwise, transparent enforcement may, in fact, stimulate noncompliance. 
nomically inefficient since they do not allow more cost-effective substitutions. Performance 
standards, while more economically efficient, are enforceable only to the extent that the 
technology exists to monitor performance reliably (Wasserman, 1992). In the international 
arena, the importance of types of standards used by a treaty for achieving compliance is 
vividly demonstrated by the case of the MARPOL Convention, where a move during the 
1970s from discharge standards to equipment standards in dealing with vessel-source oil 
pollution has resulted in a dramatic shift of the treaty effectiveness (M'Gonigle and Zacher, 
1979; Mitchell, 1992). 
Finally, a differentiation of treaty regulations among parties can also matter for 
promoting compliance. In asymmetrical regimes, treaty obligations or timetables for 
complying with treaty objectives are differentiated according to the special circumstances of 
each party (usually economic capacity or geographic position). When different obligations 
are translated into different national abatement targets - equitable rather than equal for each 
party (Sand, 1990) - the chances for compliance, even among laggards, are likely to increase 
(Broadus et al., 1993). 
1.2 Compliance infomation system 
The most frequently discussed means to increase compliance is to increase trans- 
parency (see Young, 1992, Chayes and Chayes, 1991a). Transparency is essential to the 
reciprocity that forms the basis for compliance, when states are motivated by self-interest or 
are coerced into compliance. Tactics for increasing transparency involve regulating actions 
that are inherently more transparent under existing detection technologies, and providing for 
credible self-reporting to a secretariat.'' Treaty rules and procedures can also authorize 
independent inspections and surveys, enhance the information flow between parties, increase 
resources dedicated to monitoring, and finance the development of improved verification 
technologies.16 By improving the ability for, and likelihood of detecting violations, 
transparency fosters all parties' abilities to invoke reciprocity, sanctioning, and inducement 
strategies (Fisher, 1981 ; Mitchell, 1992). 
Information about poor environmental behavior of a state may also generate external 
political pressure on it from other states, especially from those directly affected by such 
behavior. Governments are increasingly concerned about their environmental images, and 
a poor compliance record renders a state less attractive as a cooperation partner (Stokke, 
1992). 
1.3 Non-compliance response system 
1.3.1 Positive incentives 
States can provide positive incentives to encourage compliance (Baldwin, 1985; 
l5 However, the tactic of self-reporting to improve transparency works only when the reports are dis- 
seminated and actually submitted. The record on that is mixed and generally negative (see GAO, 1992). 
For an excellent and detailed analysis of monitoring, verification, self-reporting and the related problems 
see Ausubel and Victor (1992). 
Young 1979). These involve rewards (or a promise of a reward) conditional upon com- 
pliance.17 As with sanctions, states often use issue linkages to provide such incentives. In 
particular, side payments and project funding provide useful levers to induce compliance 
when sanctions are politically difficult to impose, as among allies. Such inducements ease 
the non-compliance detection problem since they give actors incentives to provide information 
regarding their actions as a condition for receipt of assistance. International organizations 
can institute inducement schemes that create larger incentives than would be possible on a 
bilateral basis by facilitating burden-sharing. 
Regime-generated inducements schemes can sometimes play an important role in 
helping to increase the domestic capacity - either by transferring resources to weak gov- 
ernments in the form of technical or outright aid, or by creating inter-organizational networks 
that serve as catalysts and facilitators. Most notable current examples include the London 
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol and the nascent financial mechanism of the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. In the former case the cost of abatement actions is co- 
financed by wealthy countries; in the latter (for now) only the cost of preparing national 
reports and emissions inventories is sponsored. The World Bank's Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), which also manages the Climate Convention's financial mechanism, is 
another avenue for financing, although the bulk of GEF programs are in the general area of 
water, biodiversity, ozone and climate, rather than connected directly to questions of 
compliance with relevant treaties. Many other multilateral and bilateral aid programs also 
have environmental components, and they can assist in promoting compliance to different 
degrees (see Sand, 1990). 
Regimes can also foster the transfer of information, skills, and expertise necessary 
for effective domestic programs. Training programs, the provision of policy-relevant 
information, and research grants can help weaker governments create stronger policy 
programs. In addition to these direct activities, regimes can build coalitions with develop- 
ment banks and foreign aid agencies in order to channel major quantities of aid toward 
projects that will help weaker states increase administrative capacity. Institutions can also 
help build capacity by providing public commitments to a set of norms and principles, which 
domestic proponents of adjustment measures can use in attempting to overcome their 
opponents in funding and "turf battles" (Haas et al., 1993). 
However, incentives can cause problems. In fact, they can cost more than sanctions 
because one pays for compliance by actors who would have complied even without such 
incentives (Schelling, 196011980). Disincentives to provide funding pose the major obstacle 
to successful inducement schemes. While funding programs may prove difficult to enact and 
small in magnitude, the relevant (and as yet unexplored) question is, however, whether treaty 
arrangements make funding or compliance more likely than it would be without the treaty, 
" Some authors have suggested that inducements - "compliance-oriented strategies" - prove more effective 
at increasing compliance than do punishments - "sanctions-oriented strategies' (Hawkins, 1984). Nagel (1975) 
lists eight positive and negative incentives (sanctions) applied on the domestic environmental enforcement front 
in the decreasing rank order of their effectiveness: (1) discharge taxes or fees, (2) contingent injunctions 
(involving a court order directed toward a polluter saying that if his pollution is not eliminated or decreased 
below a certain level, the he will be ordered to cease operating), (3) tax rewards and subsidies, (4) objective 
civil penalties, (5) publicizing wrongdoers, (6) selective government buying power, (7) fines and jail sentences, 
and (8) conference persuasion. 
and whether these arrangements are successful at increasing compliance (Mitchell, 1992).18 
1.3.2 Negative sanctions 
The traditional remedy for non-compliance has involved deterrence through the threat 
or use of sanctions. Proponents of sanctions contend that "compliance can be obtained 
efficiently by making violation unattractive rather than by altering the costs or benefits of 
compliancen (Young, 1979:20). However, sanctions strategies face major constraints on their 
effectiveness in domestic (see Hawkins, 1984)'' and international (see Fisher, 1981) 
environments: the difficulty of sustaining a coalition to apply sanctions (e.g., Martin, 1992) 
and the interference in another state's domestic politics, which both contravenes state 
sovereignty and includes the risk that the state's constituents will become incensed by foreign 
interference and mobilize against it (Galtung, 1967). These arguments have been extensively 
debated (e.g., Lenway, 1988) and analyzed (e.g., Hufbauer et al., 1990). 
Most sanctions in international environmental agreements are actually used to promote 
participation in the agreement, rather than as direct enforcement actions (Charnovitz, 1993). 
As with sanctions in general, their efficacy is highly debated. Typically, the debate is a 
balance between the apparent effectiveness of sanctions, when applied by a large powerful 
state against the weaker one, versus the unfair nature of that kind of enforcement mechanism, 
and the fact that unilateral extra-treaty measures may undermine the legitimacy of the treaty 
itself. As is noted by Chayes and Chayes (1991a), "the structural realities of international 
life preclude 'enforcement' by means of sanctions except in very special circumstances". 
From the viewpoint of domestic compliance, a particularly interesting element of 
sanctions in the environmental arena is the notion of what Chayes and Chayes have called 
"second-level enforcement". They note that "the use of domestic enforcement procedures 
is likely to be possible in an increasing range of cases, like environmental treaties, where 
international regimes are aimed ultimately at influencing the private activities rather than state 
behavior" (Chayes and Chayes, 1991b). While governments may be unwilling to authorize 
sanctions by one government against another, they may be willing to authorize sanctioning 
of private individuals and corporations under their control. A further step would be to open 
national administrative and, perhaps, judicial processes to participation of outside NGOs or 
even international institutions, when the affected state is a party to a relevant treaty (Chayes 
and Chayes, 1991a).20 This may skirt the difficult sovereignty issue, but will depend on 
whether states that seek to induce compliance have jurisdiction over the activity being 
A recent comparative assessment of regional marine pollution control programs has concluded that the 
effectiveness of such a commonly used international funding mechanism as a regional trust fund is not clear 
from the observed experience and must be carefully questioned (Broadus et al., 1993). 
l9 For a detailed analysis of the application of sanctions in the domestic environmental enforcement front 
see also Russell et al. (1986), Richardson et al. (1982), Wasserman (1992), Segerson and Tietenberg (1992), 
and Cohen (1992). 
A path-breaking move of this kind is the Nordic Environmental Protection Convention, which permits 
each of the three Scandinavian countries to appear in the administrative or judicial processes of the others on 
matters dealing with the environment. In Europe, the expanding applicability of European Community law 
offers many opportunities to press environmental claims in courts, even in those states where domestic law and 
local procedure are not favorable (see e.g., Haig, 1992). 
regulated. Treaties structured to take advantage of such opportunities to facilitate the 
focusing of sanctions and incentives on individual actors will provide another means of 
increasing compliance (Mitchell, 1992).21 
1.4 Role of regimes in increasing domestic concern 
International regimes can affect the degree of domestic compliance with treaty norms 
and rules by boosting domestic concern, and thus make it possible to adjust national policies 
in accord with institutionally expressed norms and principles. 
In addition to offering rewards or punishments, regimes can also generate new 
information (by normative pronouncements accompanied by collaborative scientific reviews) 
that alters the states' (particularly laggards') perception of the consequences of their 
actions." Sometimes such a process of redefinition of interest occurs through the 
interaction of institutional activity and networks of scientists and experts known as epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1990). 
Treaty processes can also encourage processes of social learning by which the 
governments and other actors may alter their values and behavior. Modern treaty-making 
can be seen as a creative enterprise, through which the parties not only weigh the benefits 
and burdens of commitment, but explore, redefine and sometimes discover their interests in 
general, and particularly longer range national interests and values. This, if adequately 
reflected in the treaty, will help to increase environmental concern and induce compliance 
(Keohane, 1984; Chayes and Chayes, 1993). 
Institutions can also heighten state concern by magnifying public pressure on recal- 
citrant states, e.g., by fostering competition among governments to be (or to seem) more pro- 
environment. Institutions can shape domestic policy by providing information that is useful 
to particular domestic factions, by helping bureaucracies fighting "turf battles", and by 
generating salient public commitments around which political actors can focus domestic 
debates. International institutions can also interact with NGOs and environmental movements 
to increase public concern, either through cooperative programs or as a result of public 
criticism of the international institutions and national policies by NGOs. They play an active 
role, using information gained at formal international meetings, as well as public statements 
made by government officials, to embarrass governments and criticize national policies.23 
Szasz (1991) argues that on the global level (but not necessarily on the level of, for example, the EC) 
national supervision is still preferable to an international one. First, the world community has practically no 
experience in the governance of individual enterprises (with, perhaps, to some extent the IAEA), and thus it 
is difficult even to speculate about the sort of institutions that would be required for this purpose. Second, such 
detailed governance would require a degree of intrusion into domestic affairs that few countries would be willing 
to tolerate. 
Compliance becomes more attractive if new information or scientific knowledge increases the perceived 
benefits of compliance or the costs of enviro~lental damage. New information about the local costs of 
pollution can increase domestic political pressure for compliance (Mitchell, 1992). 
NGOs, however, quite frequently face serious difficulties in effectively responding to noncompliance 
and nonenforcement. They often lack the resources and the legal authority to use those resources in ways that 
would pose credible threats to governments. While national governments are not the only actors on the 
international scene, they continue to dominate in the legitimate use of force and coercion. Even in issue areas 
Under these conditions, international institutions are part of a complex network of 
governments, international institutions, nonprofit NGOs, the mass media, and industry 
groups, in which public pressure may overwhelm industry and government resistance (Haas 
et al., 1993). 
International institutions can focus normative pressure on states as well. International 
scholars have long noted the power of norms and principles in shaping behavior of the states 
(Kratochwil, 1989; Nadelman, 1990), although it has been difficult to track accurately when 
and how such norms develop. As has been shown above (para 3.5), high degrees of 
compliance with most international agreements may reflect the operation of such norms and 
principles rather than the fear of formal enforcement (Ausubel and Victor, 1992). When 
international principles and norms have been agreed upon, they may acquire a certain 
legitimacy and then be regarded as premises, or as intrinsically valuable, rather than as 
contestable reflections of interest-based compromises. 
Regimes can also increase concern by linking issues. A laggard state may have little 
concern about an environmental problem, but if a regime helps link the environmental issue 
to other issues that are of concern, then laggards may reevaluate their reluctance. Such 
linkage is direct in the case of material incentives, such as financial aid or technology 
transfer, but is present also in a less direct form when governments exert diplomatic pressure 
within the context of an environmental institution, raising the pros& that life may be made 
difficult for the laggard in other areas if the laggard does not come around. Regimes help 
increase such diplomatic pressure, both by making a laggard's opposition public, and by 
creating the opportunity to form interstate coalitions explicitly designed to put pressure on 
laggards. 
International regimes are not always successful in enhancing concern about envi- 
ronmental problems; they are typically weak unless other forces - notably, domestic envi- 
ronmental movements - create conditions for their effective operation (Haas et al., 1993). 
2 Factors exogenous to the treaty 
2.1 Economic and technology changes 
Several authors (Gilpin, 1981; Strange, 1983) argue that economic and technology 
changes may cause national governments to change their costJbenefit calculus as to which 
rules or norms of behavior should be reinforced and observed and which should be disre- 
garded and changed. These changes, which arise exogenously to the regime, may either 
where NGOs have taken action, such as whaling and debt-for-nature swaps, the actions tend to address only a 
small fraction of the problem (Mitchell, 1992). Overall, NGOs have been successful in influencing global issues 
when those issues involve funding and when they can find allies within the structures of their own countries to 
bring pressure to bear on carefully chosen objectives. But they have been less successful on issues that do not 
hinge on donorcountry funding (Porter and Brown, 1991). 
increase or decrease incentives to comply with treaty rules." The changes that make it 
easier or cheaper to comply (e.g., developing lower cost means to comply with existing 
rules) may increase compliance by both "leaders" and "laggards", dominant states and 
weaker states. At the same time, changes in the general economic situation, like domestic 
recession, may detrimentally affect compliance e.g., by drastically reducing the amount of 
funds available for environmental protection. As the current experience of FSU and Eastern 
Europe suggests, systemic transformation processes can also virtually undermine national 
financial and administrative capacity to combat pressing environmental problems and to 
comply with international commitments. 
Changes of this type can also increase compliance by affecting a dominant state's 
power and interests in enforcing collective aims. For example, improved verification 
capabilities controlled by a few countries (e.g., satellite surveillance) would help to monitor 
activities, making it possible to impose sanctions more swiftly, and thereby increase 
compliance (Mitchell, 1992). The release of technical capabilities devoted to national 
security may greatly improve public awareness about environmental changes, ranging from 
deforestation to extent of snow cover and ice thickness, and thereby bolster domestic 
environmental concern (Ausubel and Victor, 1992). Finally, more energetic international 
actions for environmental protection are frequently facilitated by the availability of techno- 
logical options that have made such objectives appear feasible (Haas et al., 1993). For 
example, the development of new monitoring technology (e.g., for measuring transboundary 
marine or non-point source pollution) may allow for verification and enforcement of 
agreements that otherwise would not have been possible. 
2.2 Domestic political changes 
Domestic political factors may play important roles in determining how a state 
assesses its interests. Domestic politics may constrain opportunities to violate a rule, and 
even to retaliate to another state's violations. International agreements thereby generate an 
inertia that supports compliance once it has begun. Fisher argues that treaties could take 
advantage of the political and bureaucratic constraints on compliance by requiring 
implementation in national law - either in the form of legal harmonization, or more ambi- 
tiously, by inducing member states to accept that certain international regulations made by 
a given institution automatically become domestic legislation (Fisher, 1981:237). 
Thus, treaties can influence domestic perceptions of self-interest rather than merely 
reflect them. Social and political factors may create changes in the bargaining positions of 
domestic bureaucratic and political groups which favor compliance. While treaties allow 
actors to make stronger cases for constraint than would be possible in the absence of such 
obligations, whether compliance continues may depend on who is in office. These changes 
may increase overall compliance if they reflect transnational social shifts across countries that 
include greater concern regarding the environmental issue (Mitchell, 1992). 
However, as  noted by Haas et al. (1993), technological change is in part autonomous, and in part a 
function of regime influences. Technology can be both a contributing cause and a consequence of institutional 
effectiveness. 
Other domestic strategies and political changes may also affect the ability of states 
to comply with international agreements. One example is the domestic "tying of hands", 
when the government succeeds in getting the relevant domestic interests firmly established, 
and later following these interests, pretending not to be able to overcome domestic opposition 
to a treaty (Putnam, 1988; Schelling, 196011980). Poor national modeling and forecasting 
of the consequences of a treaty (as e.g., in FCCC, where the emissions and costs models are 
totally inadequate for policy planning) can be subsequently employed as an "excuse" for poor 
compliance. Finally, unanticipated events, like domestic political crises, can completely 
change the patterns of compliance with certain commitments. 
2.3 Critical role of domestic pressure 
As is noted by Haas et al. (1993), most important sources of variation in compliance 
levels do not derive from variations in formal rules, but from variations in the degree of 
political pressure brought to bear on the issue by governments responding to domestic 
political agitation. Some international movement is possible simply from publicity generated 
by scientists and NGOs, and significant improvement in international policies has followed 
the participation of experts and scientists in influential international organizations and in 
government agencies of influential governments. Yet, there is discernibly more movement 
once most governments are subject to domestic pressure and there is a push from strong 
governments. If there is one key variable accounting for policy change, it is the degree of 
domestic environmentalist pressure in major industrialized democracies, not the decision- 
making rules of the relevant international institution. (Haas et al., 1993: 14).25 
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